

Le Centre de Recherche Commun INRIA-Microsoft Research

Jean-Jacques Lévy

INRIA Rocquencourt & MSR-INRIA Joint Centre

ENST

Mercredi 4 avril 2007





Plan

- ① Context
- ② Track A
- ③ Track B
- ④ Future

Context



- Rocquencourt, Sophia-Antipolis, Rennes, Grenoble, Nancy, Futurs (Bordeaux, Lille, Saclay) \simeq 500 chercheurs.
- premier institut de recherche européen en informatique.
40 ans en 2007.
- Automatique et Informatique.



Jacques-Louis Lions



- Redmond, Cambridge, Pékin, Silicon Valley, Bangalore \simeq 700 chercheurs.
- recherche ouverte (publications, logiciels) et principalement fondamentale, 15 ans en 2007.
- ouverture vers les universités/instituts de recherche (Trente, Aix-la-Chapelle, INRIA, Carnegie-Mellon)
- même directeur depuis 15 ans.



Rick Rashid

INRIA



Gilles Kahn

Michel Cosnard

MSR Cambridge



Roger Needham

Andrew Herbert

Joint Centre

G rard Huet
↔ J.-J. L vy

Stephen Emmott
G rard Giraudon
Jean Vuillemin
Ken Wood

mathematics and theoretical CS

- formal methods
 - programming langages
 - computer algebra
 - computer human interfaces
 - computational geometry
 - vision
 - ... INRIA ...
 - basic software (prototypes and real tools)
- b, coq, trusted logic
 - ada, caml, lelisp, lustre, estereel
 - maple libraries, scilab
 - nextStep, Mac OS X interface
 - CGAL
 - realviz
 - ilog, altavista ... exalead
 - polyspace, astree, unison
 - :


mathematics and theoretical CS

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formal thinking = theory + *hacking*

- formal methods
- programming langages
- computer algebra
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- :

Long cooperation between researchers



Track A

Software Security

Trustworthy Computing



Mathematical components

Georges Gonthier, MSR
Assia Mahboubi, INRIA-MSR
Enrico Tassi, Bologna
Y. Bertot, L. Rideau, INRIA Sophia

Sean McLaughlin, Carnegie Mellon
Benjamin Werner, INRIA Futurs
Roland Zumkeller, LIX

Computational proofs

- computer assistance for long formal proofs.
- Georges Gonthier proved 4-color theorem in 2001-2004 (60000 lines of Coq).



4-color

Appel-Haken



finite groups

Feit-Thompson



Kepler

Hales

Section R_props.

(* The `ring` axioms, and some useful basic corollaries. *)

```
Hypothesis multix : forall x, 1 * x = x.  
Hypothesis mult0x : forall x : R, 0 * x = 0.  
Hypothesis plus0x : forall x : R, 0 + x = x.  
Hypothesis minusxx : forall x : R, x - x = 0.  
Hypothesis plusA : forall x1 x2 x3 : R, x1 + (x2 + x3) = x1 + x2 + x3.  
Hypothesis plusC : forall x1 x2 : R, x1 + x2 = x2 + x1.  
Hypothesis multA : forall x1 x2 x3 : R, x1 * (x2 * x3) = x1 * x2 * x3.  
Hypothesis multC : forall x1 x2 : R, x1 * x2 = x2 * x1.  
Hypothesis distrR : forall x1 x2 x3 : R, (x1 + x2) * x3 = x1 * x3 + x2 * x3.
```

```
Lemma plusCA : forall x1 x2 x3 : R, x1 + (x2 + x3) = x2 + (x1 + x3).  
Proof. move=> *; rewrite !plusA; congr ( _ + _ ); exact: plusC. Qed.
```

```
Lemma multCA : forall x1 x2 x3 : R, x1 * (x2 * x3) = x2 * (x1 * x3).  
Proof. move=> *; rewrite !multA; congr ( _ * _ ); exact: multC. Qed.
```

```
Lemma distrL : forall x1 x2 x3 : R, x1 * (x2 + x3) = x1 * x2 + x1 * x3.  
Proof. by move=> x1 x2 x3; rewrite !(multC x1) distrR. Qed.
```

Lemma oppK : involutive opp.

```
Proof.  
by move=> x; rewrite -{2}[x]plus0x -(minusxx (- x)) plusC plusA minusxx plus0x.  
Qed.
```

Lemma multmix : forall x, -1 * x = -x.

```
Proof.  
move=> x; rewrite -[_ * x]plus0x -(minusxx x) -{1}[x]multix plusC plusCA plusA.  
by rewrite -distrR minusxx mult0x plus0x.  
Qed.
```

Lemma mult_opp : forall x1 x2 : R, (- x1) * x2 = - (x1 * x2).

```
Proof. by move=> *; rewrite -multmix -multA multmix. Qed.
```

Lemma opp_plus : forall x1 x2 : R, - (x1 + x2) = - x1 - x2.

```
Proof.  
by move=> x1 x2; rewrite -multmix multC distrR -(multC -1) !multmix.  
Qed.
```

Lemma RofSnE : forall n, RofSn n = n + 1.

```
Proof. by elim=> /= [|- -> //]; rewrite plus0x. Qed.
```

Lemma Raddn : forall m n, (m + n)%N = m + n :=> R.

```
Proof.  
move=> m n; elim: m => /= [!m IHm]; first by rewrite plus0x.  
by rewrite !RofSnE IHm plusC plusCA plusA. Qed.
```

Lemma Rsubn : forall m n, m >= n -> (m - n)%N = m - n :=> R.

Proof.

move=> m n; move/leq_add_sub=> Dm.

by rewrite -{2}Dm Raddn -plusA plusCA minusxx plusC plus0x.

Qed.

Lemma Rmuln : forall m n, (m * n)%N = m * n :=> R.

Proof.

move=> m n; elim: m => / = [!m IHm]; first by rewrite mult0x.

by rewrite Raddn RofSnE IHm distrR mult1x plusC.

Qed.

Lemma RexpSnE : forall x n, RexpSn x n = x ^ n * x.

Proof. by move=> x; elim=> / = [!_ -> //]; rewrite mult1x. Qed.

Lemma mult_exp : forall x1 x2 n, (x1 * x2) ^ n = x1 ^ n * x2 ^ n.

Proof.

by move=> x1 x2; elim=> // = n IHn; rewrite !RexpSnE IHn -!multA (multCA x1).

Qed.

Lemma exp_addn : forall x n1 n2, x ^ (n1 + n2) = x ^ n1 * x ^ n2.

Proof.

move=> x n1 n2; elim: n1 => / = [!n1 IHn]; first by rewrite mult1x.

by rewrite !RexpSnE IHn multC multCA multA.

Qed.

Lemma Rexpn : forall m n, (m ^ n)%N = m ^ n :=> R.

Proof. by move=> m; elim=> // = n IHn; rewrite Rmuln RexpSnE IHn multC. Qed.

Lemma exp0n : forall n, 0 < n -> 0 ^ n = 0.

Proof. by move=> [!|n] // = _; rewrite multC mult0x. Qed.

Lemma exp1n : forall n, 1 ^ n = 1.

Proof. by elim=> // = n IHn; rewrite RexpSnE IHn mult1x. Qed.

Lemma exp_muln : forall x n1 n2, x ^ (n1 * n2) = (x ^ n1) ^ n2.

Proof.

move=> x n1 n2; rewrite mulnC; elim: n2 => // = n2 IHn.

by rewrite !RexpSnE exp_addn IHn multC.

Qed.

Lemma sign_odd : forall n, (-1) ^ odd n = (-1) ^ n.

Proof.

move=> n; rewrite -{2}[n]odd_double_half addnC double_mul2 exp_addn exp_muln.

by rewrite / = mult1x oppK expn mult1x.

Qed.

Lemma sign_addb : forall b1 b2, (-1) ^ (b1 (+) b2) = (-1) ^ b1 * (-1) ^ b2.

Proof. by do 2!case; rewrite // = ?mult1x ?mult1x ?oppK. Qed.□

Lemma matrix_transpose_mul : forall m n p (A : M_(m, n)) (B : M_(n, p)),
 $\backslash\text{tr} (A * m B) = m \backslash\text{tr} B * m \backslash\text{tr} A$.

Proof. split => k i; apply: eq_isumR => j _; exact: multC. **Qed.**

Lemma matrix_multx1 : forall m n (A : M_(m, n)), A * m \1m =m A.

Proof.

move => m n A; apply: matrix_transpose_inj.

by rewrite matrix_transpose_mul matrix_transpose_unit matrix_mult1x.

Qed.

Lemma matrix_distrR : forall m n p (A1 A2 : M_(m, n)) (B : M_(n, p)),
 $(A1 +m A2) * m B =m A1 * m B +m A2 * m B$.

Proof.

move => m n p A1 A2 B; split => i k /=; rewrite -isum_plus.

by apply: eq_isumR => j _; rewrite -distrR.

Qed.

Lemma matrix_distrL : forall m n p (A : M_(m, n)) (B1 B2 : M_(n, p)),
 $A * m (B1 +m B2) =m A * m B1 +m A * m B2$.

Proof.

move => m n p A B1 B2; apply: matrix_transpose_inj.

rewrite matrix_transpose_plus !matrix_transpose_mul.

by rewrite -matrix_distrR -matrix_transpose_plus.

Qed.

Lemma matrix_multA : forall m n p q
(A : M_(m, n)) (B : M_(n, p)) (C : M_(p, q)), []
 $A * m (B * m C) =m A * m B * m C$.

Proof.

move => m n p q A B C; split => i l /=.

transitivity (\sum_(k) (\sum_(j) (A i j * B j k * C k l))).

rewrite exchange_isum; apply: eq_isumR => j _; rewrite isum_distrL.

by apply: eq_isumR => k _; rewrite multA.

by apply: eq_isumR => j _; rewrite isum_distrR.

Qed.

Lemma perm_matrixM : forall n (s t : S_(n)),
 $\text{perm_matrix} (s * t) \% G =m \text{perm_matrix} s * m \text{perm_matrix} t$.

Proof.

move => n; split => i j /=; rewrite (isumD1 (s i)) // set11 mult1x -permM.

rewrite isum0 => [!j!]; first by rewrite plusC plus0x.

by rewrite andbT; move/negbET->; rewrite mult0x.

Qed.

Lemma matrix_trace_plus : forall n (A B : M_(n)), $\backslash\text{tr} (A +m B) = \backslash\text{tr} A + \backslash\text{tr} B$.

Proof. by move => n A B; rewrite -isum_plus. **Qed.**

(* And now, finally, the title feature. *)

```
Lemma determinant_multilinear : forall n (A B C : M_n) i0 b c,  
  row i0 A = m b * sm row i0 B + m c * sm row i0 C ->  
  row' i0 B = m row' i0 A -> row' i0 C = m row' i0 A ->  
  \det A = b * \det B + c * \det C.
```

Proof.

move=> n A B C i0 b c ABC.

move/matrix_eq_rem_row=> BA; move/matrix_eq_rem_row=> CA.

rewrite !sum_distrL -isum_plus; apply: eq_isumR => s _.

rewrite !(multCA (_ ^ s)) -distrL; congr (_ * _).

rewrite !(@iproduct1 _ i0 (setA _)) // (matrix_eq_row ABC) distrR !multA.

by congr (_ * _ + _ * _); apply: eq_iprodR => i;

rewrite andbT => ?; rewrite ?BA ?CA.

Qed.

```
Lemma alternate_determinant : forall n (A : M_n) i1 i2,  
  i1 != i2 -> A i1 = 1 A i2 -> \det A = 0.
```

Proof.

move=> n A i1 i2 Di12 A12; pose r := I_n.

pose t := transp i1 i2; pose tr s := (t * s)%G.

have trK : involutive tr by move=> s; rewrite /tr mulgA transp2 mul1g.

have Etr: forall s, odd_perm (tr s) = even_perm s.

by move=> s; rewrite odd_permM odd_transp Di12.

rewrite /(\det _) (isumID (@even_perm r)) /=; set S1 := \sum(in _) _.

rewrite -{2}(minusxx S1); congr (_ + _); rewrite {}/S1 -isumOpp.

rewrite (reindex_isum tr); last by exists tr.

symmetry; apply: eq_isum => [s | s seven]; first by rewrite negbK Etr.

rewrite -mult1x multA Etr seven (negbET seven) mult1x; congr (_ * _).

rewrite (reindex_iprod t); last by exists (t : _ -> _) => i _; exact: transpK.

apply: eq_iprodR => i _; rewrite permM /t.

by case: transpP => // ->; rewrite A12.

Qed.□

```
Lemma determinant_transpose : forall n (A : M_n), \det (\^t A) = \det A.
```

Proof.

move=> n A; pose r := I_n; pose ip p : permType r := p^A-1.

rewrite /(\det _) (reindex_isum ip) /=; last first.

by exists ip => s _; rewrite /ip invgK.

apply: eq_isumR => s _; rewrite odd_permV /= (reindex_iprod s).

by congr (_ * _); apply: eq_iprodR => i _; rewrite permK.

by exists (s^A-1 : _ -> _) => i _; rewrite ?permK ?permKv.

Qed.

```
Lemma determinant_perm : forall n s, \det (@perm_matrix n s) = (-1) ^ s.
```

Proof.

move=> n s; rewrite /(\det _) (isumD1 s) //.

rewrite iprod1 => [i _]; last by rewrite /= set11.

rewrite isum0 => [!t Dst]; first by rewrite plusC plus0x multC mult1x.

case: (pickP (fun i => s i != t i)) => [i ist | Est].

by rewrite (iproduct1 i) // multCA /= (negbET ist) mult0x.

move: Dst; rewrite andbT; case/eqP.


```

Lemma determinant1 : forall n, \det (unit_matrix n) = 1.
Proof.
move=> n; have:= @determinant_perm n 1%G; rewrite odd_perm1 => /- <-.
apply: determinant_extensional; symmetry; exact: perm_matrix1.
Qed.
□
Lemma determinant_scale : forall n x (A : M_(n)),
  \det (x *sm A) = x ^ n * \det A.
Proof.
move=> n x A; rewrite isum_distrL; apply: eq_isumR => s _ .
by rewrite multCA iprod_mult iprod_id card_ordinal.
Qed.
Lemma determinantM : forall n (A B : M_(n)), \det (A *m B) = \det A * \det B.
Proof.
move=> n A B; rewrite isum_distrR.
pose AB (f : F_(n)) (s : S_(n)) i := A i (f i) * B (f i) (s i).
transitivity (\sum_(f) \sum_(s : S_(n)) (-1) ^ s * \prod_(i) AB f s i).
  rewrite exchange_isum; apply: eq_isumR => s _ .
  by rewrite -isum_distrL distr_iprodA_isumA.
rewrite (isumID (fun f => uniq (fval f))) plusC isum0 ?plus0x => /- [If UF].
  rewrite (reindex_isum (fun s => val (pval s))); last first.
  have s0 : S_(n) := 1%G; pose uf (f : F_(n)) := uniq (fval f).
  pose pf f := if insub uf f is Some s then Perm s else s0.
  exists pf => /- f UF; rewrite /pf (insubT uf UF) //; exact: eq_fun_of_perm.
apply: eq_isum => [sIs _]; rewrite (valP (pval s)) // isum_distrL.
  rewrite (reindex_isum (mulg s)); last first.
  by exists (mulg s^(-1)) => t; rewrite ?mulKgV ?mulKg.
  apply: eq_isumR => t _; rewrite iprod_mult multA multCA multA multCA multA.
  rewrite -sign_permM; congr (_ * _); rewrite (reindex_iprod s^(-1)); last first.
  by exists (s : _ -> _) => i _; rewrite ?permK ?permKv.
  by apply: eq_iprodR => i _; rewrite permM permKv ?set11 // -{3}[i](permKv s).
transitivity (\det (\matrix_(i, j) B (f i j)) * \prod_(i) A i (f i)).
  rewrite multC isum_distrL; apply: eq_isumR=> s _ .
  by rewrite multCA iprod_mult.
suffices [i1 [i2 E f12 Di12]]: exists i1, exists2 i2, f i1 = f i2 & i1 != i2.
  by rewrite (alternate_determinant Di12) ?mult0x => /- j; rewrite E f12.
pose ninj i1 i2 := (f i1 == f i2) && (i1 != i2).
case: (pickP (fun i1 => ~ set0b (ninj i1))) => [i1 injf].
  by case/set0Pn=> i2; case/andP; move/eqP; exists i1; exists i2.
case/(perm_uniqP f): Uf => i1 i2; move/eqP=> Df12; apply/eqP.
by apply/idPn=> Di12; case/set0Pn: (injf i1); exists i2; apply/andP.
Qed.

```

(* And now, the Laplace formula. *)

```

Definition cofactor n (A : M_(n)) (i j : I_(n)) :=
  (-1) ^ (val i + val j) * \det (row' i (col' j A)).

```

(* Same bug as determinant
Add Morphism cofactor with



Tools for formal proofs


Damien Doligez, INRIA Rocq.
Leslie Lamport, MSR
Stephan Merz, INRIA Lorraine

Natural proofs

- first-order set theory + temporal logic
- specifications/verification of concurrent programs.
- tools for automatic theorem proving



TLA+



tools for proofs



Zenon

TLA⁺ example: a clock

$$Clockini \triangleq hr \in \{0, \dots, 23\} \wedge min \in \{0, \dots, 59\}$$

$$Hr \triangleq hr' = hr \wedge min' = min + 1$$

$$Min \triangleq hr' = hr + 1 \wedge min' = 0$$

$$Clocknxt \triangleq min < 59 \wedge Hr \\ \vee min = 59 \wedge Min$$

$$Clock \triangleq Clockini \wedge \square [Clocknxt]_{<hr,min>}$$

- *Clockini* is a predicate that describes the possible initial states.
- *Clocknxt* is a predicate of two states: the current state, described by unprimed variables, and the next state, described by primed variables.
- *Clock* is a temporal formula that specifies all the possible behaviours of our clock: they start in a state that satisfies *Clockini* and every step they take must be a *Clocknxt* step.



Secure Distributed Computations and their Proofs

Cédric Fournet, MSR

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Pierre-Malo Deniérou, INRIA Rocq.

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Francesco Zappa Nardelli, INRIA Rocq.

Distributed computations + Security

- programming with secured communications
- certified compiler from high level primitives to low level crypto-protocols
- formal proofs of probabilistic protocols





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
Francesco Zappa Nardelli, INRIA Rocq.

Distributed computations + Security

- programming with secured communications
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- formal proofs of probabilistic protocols



Simple Exchange



```
session S =  
  role requester : int =  
    !Request:string;  
    ?(Response:int + Fault:unit)  
  
  role directory : string =  
    ?Request:string;  
    !(Response:int + Fault:unit)
```


Session declaration

```
let lookup name =  
  S.requester ["client";"server"]  
    (Request  
      (name,  
        {hResponse = (fun _ q → q);  
         hFault = (fun _ x → failwith "Failed")  
        })))  
in lookup "Ricardo"
```

User code



Negotiation



session S2 =

role customer : **string** =

!Query:int;


mu start.?(Accept:unit +
Condition:unit;!(NewOffer:int;start + Reject:unit))

role store : **string**=

?Query:int;

mu start.!(Accept:unit +
Condition:unit;?(NewOffer:int;start + Reject:unit))

Three-party session for the Demo



session S3 =

role customer :string =

!Query:int;

mu start.?(Accept:unit;!Confirm:unit +
Condition:unit; !(Newoffer:int;start + Reject:unit;))

role store :string=

?Contract:int;

mu start.!(Accept:unit +
Condition:unit; ?(Newoffer:int;start + Reject:unit;!Abort:unit))


role officer :string=

?Query:int;!Contract:int;?(Confirm:unit + Abort:unit)



Visibility


- Minimal sequence of signatures that guarantee session compliance.
- Example:






No Fork

- Some forks in protocols represent a security threat.



- Property



Track B

Computational Sciences



Current proposals

● Information interaction

- ▶ dynamic encyclopedia of **mathematics**
(Bruno Salvy, Alin Bostan, Frédéric Chyzak)
- ▶ management of scientific **workflows**
(Wendy Mackay, J.-D. Fekete, Mary Czerwinski, George Robertson)

● Scientific data visualisation

- ▶ image and video analysis for **environmental** sciences
(Patrick Perez, Andrew Blake)
- ▶ **geometric** methods for data analysis
(J.-D. Boissonnat, F. Chazal, F. Cazals, D. Cohen-Steiner)

Future

Future

- install Track B in 2007
- 30 researchers
- tight links with french academia (phD, post-doc)
- develop useful research for scientific community
- provide public tools (BSD licence)
- become a new and attractive pole in CS research

