

On the logical structure of choice and bar induction principles

Hugo Herbelin

joint work with Nuria Brede


Proof Theory Virtual Seminar

16 June 2021

(includes post-seminar errata)

Talk based on the paper *On the logical structure of choice and bar induction principles*, *LICS'21*, with a few refinements

Standard results about the axiom of choice



BPI = Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem
 UF = Ultrafilter Theorem
 AC = Axiom of Choice
 DC = Axiom of Dependent Choice
 WKL = Weak König's Lemma

ZL_ω = Countable Zorn's Lemma
 BI = Bar Induction
 $(W)FT$ = (Weak) Fan Theorem
 $Compl$ = Gödel's Completeness Theorem

Use **logical duality** as guiding classification principle:

choice principles
ill-foundedness properties

bar induction principles
barredness properties

considered as **extensionality schemes**


effective \Rightarrow observational

observational \Rightarrow effective

Different definitions of well-founded tree

An intrinsically well-founded definition of tree

A simple “effective” definition: **well-founded** tree as an **inductive type**



```
Inductive wftree :=  
| leaf : wftree  
| node : (B → wftree) → wftree
```

Trees (and their negative) as predicates

Let B be a domain and u ranges over the set B^* of finite sequences of elements of B . We write $\langle \rangle$ for the empty sequence and $u \star b$ for the extension with one element. We define:


T is a tree (closure under restriction) $\forall u \forall a (u \star a \in T \Rightarrow u \in T)$	T is monotone (closure under extension) $\forall u \forall a (u \in T \Rightarrow u \star a \in T)$
---	---

From trees as inductive types to trees as predicates

To any inductively-defined tree t , we can associate a tree-as-predicate $t^\#$ by recursion on t as follows:

$$u \in \mathbf{leaf}^\# \triangleq \perp$$

$$u \in \mathbf{node}(f)^\# \triangleq u = \langle \rangle \vee \exists a \exists u' (u = a@u' \wedge u' \in f(a)^\#)$$



Two characterisations of a well-founded tree-as-predicate

Effective characterisation of a well-founded tree-as-predicate

T has an inductive skeleton

$$\exists t : \mathbf{wftree} (T = t^\#)$$

Effective characterisation of a well-founded tree-as-predicate

T has an inductive skeleton

$$\exists t : \text{wftree} (T = t^\#)$$

which can be equivalently bundled into

T *inductively well-founded* is short for *inductively well-founded at* $\langle \rangle \in A^*$


T *inductively well-founded at* u holds when:

- $u \notin T$
- or, recursively, for all a , T is *inductively well-founded at* $u \star a$

Observational characterisation of a well-founded tree-as-predicate

T observationally well-founded

$$\forall \beta \in \mathbb{N} \rightarrow B. \exists n \in \mathbb{N}. \neg T(\beta|_n)$$



Two characterisations of a well-founded tree-as-predicate

- From the “**effective**” representation of a **well-founded** tree we can always construct a predicate that is an “**observational**” representation of the tree
- To conversely obtain an effective representation of a tree T from its observational representation requires an axiom:

$$T \text{ observationally well-founded} \implies T \text{ inductively well-founded}$$

Bar Induction

If instead we build the *negative* of a tree-as-predicate and restate well-foundedness on the negative tree, one obtain bar induction:

- T *inductively well-founded* is the same as $\neg T$ *inductively barred*
- T *observationally well-founded* is the same $\neg T$ *barred*
- **Bar Induction** says that for a type B and a tree T ,

$$\underbrace{T \text{ barred}}_{\text{observational}} \implies \underbrace{T \text{ inductively barred}}_{\text{effective}}$$

Dually: ill-foundedness

Dually, *ill-foundedness* of a tree T can be defined in different ways.

Let us concentrate on the finite-branching case. We have:

Effective view

$$T \text{ is staged infinite} \triangleq \forall n \exists u |u| = n \wedge u \in T$$

Observational view

$$T \text{ has an infinite branch} \triangleq \exists \alpha \forall u \leq \alpha T(u)$$

Weak König's Lemma connects the two views (when B is $\mathbb{B}oolean$):

$$\mathbf{WKL}_T \triangleq T \text{ is staged infinite} \Rightarrow T \text{ has an infinite branch}$$

Observation: a diversity of definitions for the “effective” versions of “barred”/“well-founded” and “ill-founded”

Kőnig's Lemma: T is staged infinite $\Rightarrow T$ has an infinite branch (B finite)

C_{WKL} : T is a spread $\Rightarrow T$ has an infinite branch (J. Berger, $B = \mathbb{Bool}$)

Fan Theorem: T barred $\Rightarrow T$ uniformly barred (B finite, Brouwer)

Fan Theorem: T barred $\Rightarrow T$ staged barred (B finite, Ishihara)

- *having an infinite branch* is the exact dual to *barred*
- the dual of *inductively barred* is equivalent to the existence of a *spread* subset
- *being staged infinite* is dual to *uniformly barred* up to asking for T to be a tree
- *uniformly barred* and *having unbounded paths* are respectively intuitionistically and cointuitionistically equivalent to *inductively barred* and its dual *productive* for finitely-branching trees

Giving a name to these definitions

T is progressing ¹ at u $u \in T \Rightarrow (\exists a u \star a \in T)$	T is hereditary at u $(\forall a u \star a \in T) \Rightarrow u \in T$
T is progressing ¹ $\forall u (T \text{ is progressing at } u)$	T is hereditary $\forall u (T \text{ is hereditary at } u)$

Dual concepts on dual predicates	
<i>ill-foundedness</i>	<i>barredness-style</i>
<i>Effective concepts (finite-branching only)</i>	
T has unbounded paths $\forall n \exists u (u = n \wedge \forall v (v \leq u \Rightarrow v \in T))$	T is uniformly barred $\exists n \forall u (u = n \Rightarrow \exists v (v \leq u \wedge v \in T))$
T is staged infinite ¹ $\forall n \exists u (u = n \wedge u \in T)$	T is staged barred ¹ $\exists n \forall u (u = n \Rightarrow u \in T)$
<i>Effective concepts (arbitrary branching)</i>	
T is a spread $\langle \rangle \in T \wedge T$ progressing	T is barricaded ¹ T hereditary $\Rightarrow \langle \rangle \in T$
T is productive $\langle \rangle \in \nu X. \lambda u. (u \in T \wedge \exists b u \star b \in X)$	T is inductively barred $\langle \rangle \in \mu X. \lambda u. (u \in T \vee \forall b u \star b \in X)$
<i>Observational concepts</i>	
T has an infinite branch $\exists \alpha \forall u (u \text{ initial segment of } \alpha \Rightarrow u \in T)$	T is barred $\forall \alpha \exists u (u \text{ initial segment of } \alpha \wedge u \in T)$

used in König's Lemma

used in C_{WKL}

used in Fan Theorem

alt. used in Fan Theorem

used in Bar Induction

¹Not being aware of an established terminology for this concept, we use here our own terminology.

Giving the central rôle to *inductively barred* and its dual

We focus on the definition of the dual of *inductively barred* and on its dual *productive*.
In full:

T is *productive* (short for *productive from* $\langle \rangle \in B^*$)

T *productive from* $u \in B^*$ holds when:

- u is in T
- *and*, recursively, there is $b \in B$ such that T *productive from* $u \star b$

Giving the central rôle to *inductively barred* and its dual

Bar induction (\mathbf{BI}_{BT})

T barred $\Rightarrow T$ inductively barred

Tree-Based Dependent Choice (\mathbf{DC}_{BT}^{prod})

T productive $\Rightarrow T$ has an infinite branch

Recovering standard principles

$WKL_T \iff DC_{\mathbb{Bool}T}^{prod}$ up to classical (actually co-intuitionistic) reasoning

$WFT_T \iff BI_{\mathbb{Bool}T}$ up to intuitionistic reasoning

$DC_{BRb_0}^{serial} \iff DC_{BR^\triangleright(b_0)}^{prod}$

where

$$u \in R^\triangleright(b_0) \triangleq \text{case } u \text{ of } \left[\begin{array}{ll} \langle \rangle & \mapsto \top \\ b & \mapsto R(b_0, b) \\ u' \star b \star b' & \mapsto R(b, b') \end{array} \right]$$

$$DC_{BRb_0}^{serial} \triangleq \forall b \exists b' R(b, b') \Rightarrow \exists \alpha (\alpha(0) = b_0 \wedge \forall n R(\alpha(n), \alpha(n+1)))$$

Relaxing the sequentiality

Let A and B be domains. Let now use v to range over the set $(A \times B)^*$ of finite sequences of pairs of elements in A and B .

We say $(a, b) \in v$ if (a, b) is one of the components of v .

We write $v \leq v'$ if v is included in v' when seen as sets.

For $v \in (A \times B)^*$, we write $\text{dom}(v)$ for the set of a such that there is some b such that $(a, b) \in v$.

If $\alpha \in A \rightarrow B$, we write $v \prec \alpha$ and say that v is a finite approximation of α if $\alpha(a) = b$ for all $(a, b) \in v$.

Let T be a predicate on $(A \times B)^*$. We write $\downarrow T$ and $\uparrow T$ to mean the following inner and outer closures with respect to \leq :

$$v \in \downarrow T \triangleq \forall v' \leq v (v' \in T)$$

$$v \in \uparrow T \triangleq \exists v' \leq v (v' \in T)$$

Relaxing the sequentiality (effective view)

T inductively A - B -barred from $v \in (A \times B)^*$ holds when:

- v is in the outer closure of T
- or, recursively, there exists $a \notin \text{dom}(v)$ such that for all $b \in B$, T is inductively A - B -barred from $v \star (a, b)$

T coinductively A - B -approximable from $v \in (A \times B)^*$ holds when:

- v is in the inner closure of T
- and, recursively, for all $a \notin \text{dom}(v)$, there is $b \in B$ such that T is coinductively A - B -approximable from $v \star (a, b)$

Relaxing the sequentiality (observational view)

T *A-B-barred* if $\forall \alpha \in A \rightarrow B \exists v \prec \alpha (v \in T)$

T has an *A-B-choice function* if $\exists \alpha \in A \rightarrow B \forall v \prec \alpha (v \in T)$

This leads to the following generalisation

Generalised *Bar Induction* (GBI_{ABT})

$$\underbrace{T \text{ A-B-barred}}_{\text{observational}} \implies \underbrace{T \text{ A-B-inductively barred}}_{\text{effective}}$$

Generalised *Dependent Choice* (GDC_{ABT})

$$\underbrace{T \text{ coinductively A-B-approximable}}_{\text{effective}} \implies \underbrace{T \text{ has an A-B-choice function}}_{\text{observational}}$$

Results justifying the generalisation

$$\text{GBI}_{\mathbb{N}BT} \iff \text{BI}_{BT}$$

$$\text{GDC}_{\mathbb{N}BT} \iff \text{DC}_{BT}^{prod}$$

Actually, GBI_{ABT} and GDC_{ABT} could be further generalised into schemes $\text{GBI}_{ABT_{\leq}}$ and $\text{GDC}_{ABT_{\leq}}$ such that instantiating the order with the prefix order on approximations of $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow B$ gives BI_{BT} and DC_{BT}^{prod} while instantiating the order with the inclusion order gives GBI_{ABT} and GDC_{ABT} .

The Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem

The specialisation to $\mathbb{B}\text{ool}$ of the generalisation also captures the **Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem**.

Let $(\mathcal{B}, \vee, \wedge, \perp, \top, \neg, \vdash)$ be a Boolean algebra and I an ideal on \mathcal{B} . We extend I on $(\mathcal{B} \times \mathbb{B}\text{ool})^*$ by setting $u \in I^+$ if $(\bigvee_{(b,0) \in u} \neg b) \vee (\bigvee_{(b,1) \in u} b) \in I$. We have:

$$\text{GDC}_{\mathcal{B}\mathbb{B}\text{ool}I^+} \iff \text{BPI}_{\mathcal{B},I}$$

The full axiom of choice

Let AC_{ABR} be $\forall a^A \exists b^B R(a, b) \Rightarrow \exists \alpha^{A \rightarrow B} \forall a^A R(a, \alpha(a))$

Define the *positive alignment* R_{\top} of R by

$$R_{\top} \triangleq \lambda u. \forall (a, b) \in u R(a, b)$$

Then, AC_{ABR} arrives as the instance $\text{GDC}_{ABR_{\top}}$

Strength of the generalisation

Without further restrictions, **GDC** and **GBI** are inconsistent:

- Take $A \triangleq \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{Bool}$
- Take $B \triangleq \mathbb{N}$
- Define T so that it constrains a choice function to be injective:

$$v \in T \triangleq \forall f f' n, ((f, n) \in v) \wedge ((f', n) \in v) \Rightarrow f = f'$$

Then, in the case of **GDC**, a **coinductive A - B -approximation** can always be found but an **A - B -choice function** would be an injective function from $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{Bool}$ to \mathbb{N} , what is inconsistent.

A consistent restriction


A naive restriction is to require that:

- either A is countable
- or B is finite
- or T is atomic (or unary), meaning for all u and v :
 - in the ill-founded case $u \in T \wedge v \in T \Rightarrow u \cup v \in T$
 - in the barred case $u \cup v \in T \Rightarrow u \in T \vee v \in T$

The restriction preserves the previous instantiations and makes **GDC** equivalent to **AC** since it implies **AC**, and, conversely, each of its three restrictions is implied by a consequence of **AC**.

Dually for **GBI**.

Summary of main results



AC	= Axiom of Choice
DC	= Axiom of Dependent Choice
BPI	= Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem
Compl⁻	= Completeness (consistent ⇒ model)
WKL	= Weak König's Lemma

Compl⁺	= Completeness (valid ⇒ provable)
ZL	= Zorn's Lemma
BI	= Bar Induction
WFT	= Weak Fan Theorem

Remarks and perspectives

Studying the principles together with their dual allow to see where non-linear reasoning is used. For instance, that the equivalence between $\text{WKL}_T^{\text{staged}}$ and $\text{GDC}_{\mathbb{N}\text{Bool}T}$ is essentially classical means that the equivalence between $\text{WFT}^{\text{uniform}}$ and $\text{GBI}_{\mathbb{N}\text{Bool}T}$ is essentially non-linear. And conversely, that the latter is intuitionistic says that the former only requires the co-intuitionistic reasoning part of classical logic.

Other variants of choice can probably be added to the picture:

- U. Berger's **update induction** on functions in $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow B$ for open predicates seems to directly generalize to updates of functions on $A \rightarrow B$ for predicates of finite character (i.e. of the form $\forall v \prec \alpha (v \in T)$ or $\exists v \prec \alpha (v \in T)$), giving a **well-founded induction** principle, or dually, **maximal approximations**.
- generalisations of hybrid forms such as J. Berger's C_{Fan} seem also to be rather canonical:

$$T \text{ coinductively approximable} \wedge U \text{ barred} \Rightarrow \exists u (u \in T \wedge u \in U)$$

$$T \text{ has a choice function} \wedge U \text{ inductively barred} \Rightarrow \exists u (u \in T \wedge u \in U)$$